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Abstract—Classification models for the multivariate time series
have gained significant importance in the research community,
but not much research has been done on generating adversarial
samples for these models. Such samples of adversaries could
become a security concern. In this paper, we propose trans-
forming the existing adversarial transformation network (ATN)
on a distilled model to attack various multivariate time series
classification models. The proposed attack on the classification
model utilizes a distilled model as a surrogate that mimics
the behavior of the attacked classical multivariate time series
classification models. The proposed methodology is tested onto
1-Nearest Neighbor Dynamic Time Warping (1-NN DTW) and a
Fully Convolutional Network (FCN), all of which are trained on
18 University of East Anglia (UEA) and University of California
Riverside (UCR) datasets. We show both models were susceptible
to attacks on all 18 datasets. To the best of our knowledge,
adversarial attacks have only been conducted in the domain of
univariate time series and have not been conducted on multi-
variate time series. such an attack on time series classification
models has never been done before. Additionally, we recommend
future researchers that develop time series classification models
to incorporating adversarial data samples into their training data
sets to improve resilience on adversarial samples and to consider
model robustness as an evaluative metric.
Index Terms—Multivariate Time Series, Adversarial Machine
Learning, Perturbation Methods, Deep learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen numerous areas of research and
society impacted by machine learning and deep learning [1].
These areas include medical imaging [2], speech-recognition
[3], and manufacturing systems [4]. With the rise of smart
sensors, vast scale developments in data collection and storage,
ease of data analytics and predictive modeling, multivariate time
series data recieved from collections of sensors can be analyzed
to identify regular patterns that can be interpreted and exploited.
Many researchers have been interested in the classification
of both univariate [5]–[8] and multivariate time series [9]–
[11]. Time series classification models are used in healthcare,
where multiple lead ECG data are used to determine diagnose
cardiac ischemia, in gesture recognition, where posture-level
data is used to classify human actions, and in manufacturing,
where sensor data is used to identify product detects. The
combination of multi-channel sensor data that tracks resources
and safety systems, along with real-time analytics, creates the
possibility of automated responses to undesired operational
activities. An effective time series classification model can
capture and generalize patterns of time series signals, so it can
classify unseen data. Similarly, classification models in the field
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of computer vision take advantage of the underlying spatial
structure in images. However, studies have shown that computer
vision models incorrectly classify images that seem obvious to
the human eye, this is referred to as an adversarial attack [12].
Complex models can be tricked to incorrectly classify data
from a wide array of fields using several types of adversarial
attacks. This is a serious security issue in machine learning,
especially Deep Neural Networks (DNN), which is widely
used for vision-based tasks where adding minor disruptions
or carefully crafted noise to an input image may mislead the
image classification algorithm to make inaccurate predictions
with a high degree of confidence [13], [14]. Although DNNs
are state-of-the-art models across several fields for a number
of classification tasks, including time series classification [11],
[15], [16], these vulnerabilities have a harmful impact on
real-world applicability in domains where secure and reliable
predictions are of paramount importance [17]. Compounding
the severity of this issue, Papernot et al’s work has shown
that it is easy to transfer adversarial attacks on a particular
classifier of computer vision to other similar classifiers [18].
The focus of attacks has only recently been shifted to time
series classification models based on deep neural networks and
traditional models [19].
Many adversarial sample creation strategies have been sug-
gested to trick various DNN (state-of-the-art computer vision
models) image classification models. Most of these techniques
are targeted at the DNNs gradient information that makes them
vulnerable to these attacks [20]–[22]. Research into generating
adversarial sample for time series classification models has
been limited to the univariate time series [23]. In speech
recognition activities that translate text-to-speech, there is one
major security issue. Carlini and Wagner [24] demonstrate
how it is possible to attack text-to-speech classifiers. We also
provide multiple audio clips where the voice is not correctly
identified by a text-to-speech classifier, DeepSpeech. Certain
security concerns may arise in healthcare systems that use
time series classification algorithms, where it can be fooled
into misdiagnosing patients that may influence their disease
diagnosis. Algorithms used to detect and monitor seismic
activity in time series classification can be manipulated to
create fear and hysteria in our society. Wearables that use
time series data to classify activity of the wearer can be
fooled into convincing the users they are doing other actions.
Most of the current state-of-the-art multivariate time series
classification algorithms are traditional approaches, such as
1-Nearest Neighbor Dynamic Time Warping (1-NN DTW) [25],
WEASEL+MUSE [10] and Hidden-Unit Logistic Model [9].
However, due to their simplicity and effectiveness, DNNs are
quickly becoming excellent time series classifiers. Traditional
time series classification models are more difficult to attack
as it can be considered a black-box model with an internal
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2computation that is not differentiable. As such, it is impossible
to exploit any gradient knowledge. However, as their gradient
knowledge can be easily exploited, DNN models are more
vulnerable to white-box attacks. A white-box attack is where
the opponent has "given access to all elements of the training
procedure" [22], including the training data set, the training
algorithm, the model’s parameters and weights, and the model
architecture itself. In comparison, a black-box attack only has
access to the training process and architecture of the target
models [22].
This study proposes a proxy attack strategy on a target
classifier via a student model, trained using standard model
distillation techniques to mimic the behavior of the target
multivariate time series classification models. The student
network is the neural network distilled from another time
series classification model, called the teacher model, that learns
to approximate the output of the teacher model. Once the
student model has been trained, our adversarial transformation
network (ATN) is then trained to attack this student model.
Our methodogolies are applied onto 1-NN DTW and Fully
Convolutional Network (FCN) that are trained on 18 multivari-
ate time series bench marks from the University of East Anglia
(UEA) and the University of California, Riverside (UCR) [26].
To the best of our knowledge, the result of such an attack
on multivariate time series classification models has never
been studied before. Finally, we recommend researchers that
develop time series classification models to consider model
robustness as an evaluative metric and incorporate adversarial
data samples into their training data sets in order to further
improve resilience to adversarial attacks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides a background on the utilized multivariate time series
classification models and information on adversarial crafting
techniques used on computer vision problems. Section III
details our proposed methodologies. Section IV presents and
explains the results of our proposed methodologies on a set
of multivariate time series classification models. Section V
concludes the paper and proposes future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. Time Series Classifiers
1) Multivariate 1-Nearest Neighbor Dymanic Time Warping:
The equations below for 1-Nearest Neighbor Dynamic Time
Warping (1-NN DTW) are derived [8], [27]. Dynamic Time
Warping is a distance metric used to non-linearly align two
time series. DTW outputs a matrix of the distance path and
the shortest distance between series [28]. For two time series
X = x1, x2, . . . , xn and Y = y1, y2, . . . , ym of lengths n and
m respectively, a DTW matrix can be calculated of size n x m.
Each cell of the DTW matrix represents an alignment between
two points of the corresponding time series. Matrix calculations
must follow the following conditions: Boundary Condition:
The paths should start from the beginning of each time series
(x1, y1) and finish at the last point of each time series (xn, ym).
Continuity Condition: The paths should have no jumps in
steps; the points to consider for distance at the (i, j) point are
(i-1, j), (i, j-1), and (i-1, j-1). Monotonicity Condition: The
warping paths can only go forward in time. P is defined as a
continuous path of cell in the matrix from (x1, y1) to (xn, ym).
The sth element of P is defined as ps = d(i, j)s; where
d(i, j) = (xi-yj)2, S is the length of P = p1, p2, . . . , pS . The
distance for DTW is equal to
√
D(n,m), where the distance
of each represented cell is found in Equation (1).
D(i, j) = (xi−yj)2+min[D(i−1, j−1), D(i−1, j), D(i, j−1)]
(1)
Initiated by the following conditions:
D(1, 1) = 0;D(1, 2 . . .m) =∞;D(2 . . . n, 1) =∞ (2)
In the case of multivariate time series, the DTW distance
matrix is calculated between each channel of two multivariate
time series. The summation of the DTW distances for each
channel is then used as the similarity metric between the two
multivariate time series.
2) Multi-Fully Convolutional Network: The Multivariate
Fully Convolutional Network (Multi-FCN) is one of the first
deep learning networks used for the task of time series
classification [29]. The Multi-FCN architecture is an extension
of the original FCN model that takes a univariate time series as
input. Multi-FCN consists of 3 2D-Convolutional layers, with
convolution kernels of size 8, 5 and 3 respectively, that emit
128, 256 and 128 filters respectively. Each convolution layer
is followed by a batch normalization layer [30] with a ReLU
activation layer. A global average pooling layer is applied
after the final ReLU activation layer. The pooling layer is then
passed to a softmax layer to determine the class probability
vector.
B. Adversarial Transformation Network
Multiple different approaches for generating adversarial
samples have been proposed to attack neural networks. These
methods have focused on the task of generating adversaries for
computer vision tasks. Most of these methods use either the
gradient with respect to the image pixels of these neural net-
works or explicitly solving an optimization on the image pixel.
Baluja and Fischer [31] propose Adversarial Transformation
Networks (ATNs) to efficiently generate an adversarial sample
to attack networks by first using a self-supervised method to
train a feed-forward neural network. Given the original input
sample, ATNs modify the classifier outputs slightly to match the
adversarial target. ATNs can be parametrize as a neural network
gf (x) : x → xˆ, where f is the target model (a time series
classifier) which outputs either a class probability vector or a
sparse class label, and xˆ ∼ x, but argmax f(x) 6= argmax
f(xˆ). To find gf , minimize the following loss function :
L = β ? Lx(gf (xi), xi) + Ly(f(gf (xi)), f(xi)) (3)
where Lx is a loss function on the input space (e.g. L2 loss
function), Ly is the specially constructed loss function on the
output space of f to avoid learning the identity function, xi
is the ith sample in the dataset and β is the weighing term
between the two loss functions. It is necessary to carefully select
the loss function Ly on the output space to successfully avoid
3learning the identity function. Baluja and Fischer [31] define
the loss function Ly as Ly(y′, y) = L2(y′, r(y, t)), where
y = f(x), y′ = f(gf (x)), and r(∆) is a reranking function that
modifies y such that yk < yt, ∀k 6= t. This reranking function
r(y, t) can either be a simple one hot encoding function or
can be formulated to take advantage of the already present
y to encourage better reconstruction. The reranking function
proposed by Baluja and Fischer [31] can be formulated as:
rα(y, t) = norm
({α ? max(y) if k = t,
yk otherwise
}
k∈y
)
(4)
where α > 1 is an additional hyperparameter which
defines how much larger yt should be than the current max
classification and norm is a normalizing function that rescales
its input to be a valid probability distribution
C. Transferability Property
Papernot et al. [18] propose a black-box attack by training
a local substitute network, s, to replicate or approximate the
target deep neural network (DNN) model, f . The local sub-
stitute model is trained using synthetically generated samples
and the output of these samples are labels from f . The local
substitute network is than used to generate adversarial samples
that are misclassifications. Generating adversarial samples for
s is much easier then generating adversaries from f , as its
full knowledge/parameters are available, making it susceptible
to various attacks. The key criteria to successfully generate
adversarial samples of f is the transferability property, where
adversarial samples that misclassify s will also misclassify f .
D. Knowledge Distillation
Knowledge distillation, first proposed by Bucila et al.
[32], is a model compression technique where a small student
model, s, is trained to mimic a pretrained teacher model, f . This
process is also known as the model distillation training. The
knowledge that is distilled from f to s is done by minimizing
a loss function, where the objective of s is to imitate the
probability class vector output by the model f . Hinton et al.
[33] note that there are several instances where the probability
distribution is skewed such that the correct class probability
would have a probability close to 1 and the remaining classes
would have a probability closer to 0. For this reason, Hinton
et al. [33] recommend computing the probabilities qi from the
prenormalized logits zi, such that:
qi = σ(z;T ) = exp(zi/T )/sumjexp(zj/T ) (5)
where T is a temperature factor normally set to 1. Higher
values of T produce softer probability distributions over classes.
The loss that is minimized is the model distillation loss, further
explained in Section III-C.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Gradient Adversarial Transformation Network
This work studies black-box and white-box attacks
on multivariate time series. Both attacks use methodologies
expanded from ATNs [31]. These ATNs are generative neural
networks that take a multivariate time series x as an input and
outputs an adversarial sample xˆ.
An Adversarial Transformation Network can be parametrize
as a neural network gf (x) : x→ xˆ, where f is the model to be
attacked. The ATN is further adjusted with the gradient of the
input sample x with respect to the softmax scaled logits of the
target class output by the attacked classifier. This adjustment
results in the Gradient Adversarial Transformation Network
(GATN) as a neural network gf (x, x˜) : (x, x˜)→ xˆ, where:
x˜ =
∂x
∂ft
(6)
such that x ∈ RT is an input multivariate time series of
maximum length T , ft represents the probability of the input
series being classified as class t. Given the input gradient x˜,
the GANT can construct better adversarial samples to affect
the targeted model and reduce the perturbation added to the
sample. For this reason, the GANT model is used for all our
attacks.
This study focuses on attacking 1-NN DTW and Multi-
FCN time series classifiers. The 1-NN DTW classifier is non-
differentiable, which creates a problem for the GATN model.
A solution to overcoming the non-differentiability issue is
discussed in Section III-D, by training a student network s to
approximate the output of the non-differentiable time series
classifier f .
B. Black-box and White-box Restrictions
The formulation presented in Section III-A. is satis-
factory for white-box attacks, where the attacked model f
or the student model s is known. For black-box attacks, we
do not have access to the time series classifier or the dataset
for model training. A further restriction for black-box attacks
is to utilize only the outputted predicted label, and not the
probabilistic class vector obtained from either a softmax layer
or probabilistic approximations for classical model outputs.
For each dataset D, the training data is split into two
halves. The GATN is trained on one half of the training data
Dtrain. The remaining training data Deval is used to perform
evaluations. In addition to Deval, the unseen test set Dtest is
used for evaluation. The available dataset D is not the dataset
that the attacked model f was trained on. The available training
set of the attacked model is never utilized to train or evaluate
the GATN model. To satisfy these constraints, the available
dataset D is defined as the test set of the multivariate time
series classification task. This test set is not used to train any
attacked model f , therefore it can be used as an unseen dataset.
The test dataset is then split into two halves with equivalent
class balance. When evaluating black-box attacks, the available
dataset is treated as if it were unlabeled. Due to this restriction,
the predicted label from the attacked model f is utilized to
label the dataset prior to the attacks. This restriction adds
realism to the training of GATNs, as it is difficult to obtain
or create labeled datasets for time series tasks compared to
computer vision tasks.
4C. Training Methodology
When training models ATN and GATN, the selected
reranking function r(·) strongly affects the loss formulation
on the prediction space (Ly). When we opt for the one hot
encoding of the target class, we lose the ability to keep class
ordering and the ability to adjust the ranking weight (α) to
get less skewed adversaries. Nonetheless, to use the correct
reranking function, we must have access to the class probability
distribution, which is inaccessible to black-box attacks, or some
classical models such as 1-NN DTW, which uses distance-based
computations to evaluate the nearest neighbor, may not even
be able to calculate.
To address this limitiation, we use knowledge distillation a
a method to train a student neural network s that is equipped to
replicate the predictions of the model to be targeted f . As such,
we need to measure the attacked model’s predictions on the
dataset that we possess just one time, which can either be class
labels or probability distributions across all classes. Then we
use such labels as the ground truth labels that are conditioned
to mimic the student s. We use one hot encoding scheme to
measure the cross entropy loss in case the predictions are class
marks, otherwise we try to imitate the distribution of probability
directly. It should be remembered that the student model shares
Deval with the GATN model of the training dataset.
As suggested by Hinton et al. [33], we describe the
training scheme of the student as shown in Figure 1. We scale
the logits of the student s and teacher f (iff the teacher provides
probabilities and it is a white-box attack) by a temperature
scaling parameter τ , which is kept constant at 10 for all
experiments. When training the student model, we minimize
the loss function defined as:
Ltransfer = γ ∗ Ldistillation + (1− γ) ∗ Lstudent (7)
Ldistillation = H(σ(zf ;T = τ), σ(zs;T = τ)) (8)
Lstudent = H(y, σ(zs;T = 1)) (9)
where H is the standard cross entropy loss function, zs and
zf are the un-normalized logits of the student (s) and teacher
(f ) models respectively, σ(·) is the scaled-softmax operation
described in (5), y is the ground truth labels, and γ is a gating
parameter between the two losses and is used to maintain a
balance between how much the student s imitates the teacher
f versus how much it learns from the hard label loss. When
training a student as a white-box attack, we set γ to be 0.5,
allowing the equal weight to both losses, whereas for a black-
box attack, we set γ to be 1. Therefore for black-box attacks,
we force the student s to only mimic the teacher f to the limit
of its capacity. In setting this restriction, we limit the amount
of information that may be made available to the GATN.
D. Evaluation Methodology
We train the GATN on one of the two models because
of the different restrictions between available information
depending on whether the attack is a white-box or black-
box attack. We assert that we train the GATN only when we
conduct a white-box attack on a neural network by targeting
the target neural network f directly. In all other cases, whether
the attack is a white-box or a black-box attack, and whether
the attacked model is a neural network or a classical model,
we pick the student model s as the model attacked to train the
GATN, and then use GATN’s predictions (xˆ) to test whether
the teacher model f is also attacked if the expected adversarial
input (xˆ) is used as a reference.
During the evaluation of the qualified GATN, we calculate
the number of opponents of the f model attacked that were
obtained on the Deval training collection. We can calculate
any metric in two situations during the assessment. Provided a
split labelled dataset, we can double check whether or not an
adversary has been detected. First, we check that the ground
truth label matches the classifier’s predicted label when supplied
with an unmodified input (y = y′ when supplied with x when
supplied with f ), and then check that this predicted label
is different from the predicted label when supplied with the
adversarial input (y 6= yˆ′ when supplied with xˆ input). This
ensures that we do not count an incorrect prediction from a
random classifier as an attack.
Another circumstance is that we do not have any labeled
samples prior to splitting the dataset. This training set is an
unseen set for the attacked model f , therefore we consider that
the dataset is unlabeled, and assume that the label predicted by
the base classifier is the ground truth (y = y′ by default, when
sample x is provided to f ). This is done prior to any attack
by the GATN and is computed just once. We then define an
adversarial sample as a sample xˆ whose predicted class label
is different than the predicted ground truth label (y 6= yˆ, when
sample xˆ is provided to f ). A drawback of this approach is
that it is overly optimistic and rewards sensitive classifiers that
misclassify due to very minor alterations. In order to adhere to
an unbiased evaluation, we chose the first option, and use the
labels we know from the test set to measure the adversarial
inputs properly. In doing so, we consider the need for a labeled
test set, but as shown above, following this method is not
strictly necessary.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
All methodologies were tested on 18 benchmark datasets
for multivariate time series classification found in the UEA
and UCR repository [26]. Table I gives information about the
multivariate time series. The evaluation has two objectives,
to minimize the mean squared error (MSE) between the
training dataset and the generated samples and; to maximize
the number of adversaries for a set of chosen beta values. For
all experiments, we keep α, the reranking weight, set to 1.5,
the target class set to 0, and perform a grid search over 5
possible values of β, the reconstruction weight term, such that
β = 10−b; b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The code for all models are
available at https://github.com/houshd/TS_Adv_multivariate.
A. Experiments
In this study, both neural networks and traditional time
series classifiers were chosen as the model f to target. We use
a Fully Convolutional Network for the attacked neural network
5Fig. 1. The top diagram shows the methodology of training the model distillation used in the white-box and black-box attacks. The bottom diagram is the
methodology utilized to attack a time series classifier.
and 1-NN Dynamic Time Warping is used for the traditional
base model.
To retain the strictest definition of black and white-box
attacks, we only use the attacked model’s discrete class label for
black-box attacks and use the probability distribution expected
by the white-box attack classifier. The only exception where
a student-teacher network is not used is when conducting
a white-box attack on a FCN time series model, since
an Adversarial Transformation Network (ATN) can directly
manipulate the gradient information from a neural network.
The performance of the adversarial model is evaluated on the
teacher classification model for the original time series.
For every student model we train, we utilize the LeNet-5
architecture [34]. The LeNet-5 time series classifier is defined
as a classical Convolutional Neural network following the
structure: Conv (6 filters, 5x5, valid padding) -> Max Pooling
-> Conv (16 filters, 5x5, valid padding) -> Max Pooling ->
Fully Connected (120 units, relu) -> Fully Connected (84 units,
relu) -> Fully Connected (number of classes, softmax).
The fully convolutional network is an exptension of the FCN
model proposed by Wang et al [29]. The FCN is comprised of
three blocks, each comprised of a sequence of Convolution layer
-> Batch Normalization -> ReLU activations. All convolutional
kernels are initialized using the uniform he initialization
proposed by He et al [35]. We utilize filters of size [128,
256, 128] and kernel of size of [8, 5, 3].
One strong baseline deterministic model for classifying
multivariate time series is 1-NN DTW without a warping
window. The distance based nature of the 1-NN classifier and
the reliance on a distance matrix, 1-NN DTW cannot easily be
used to compute an equivalent soft probabilistic representation.
Since white-box attacks have access to only the probability
distribution predicted for each sample, the distance matrix
generated by DTW is used to compute an equivalent soft
probabilistic representation. The analogous representation is
such that we get the exact same result as selecting the 1-NN
6TABLE I
DATASET DESCRIPTION FOR UEA AND UCR MULTIVARIATE TIME SERIES BENCHMARKS
Dataset TrainSamples
Test
Samples Dimensions
Max Series
Length
Num.
Classes
ArticularyWordRecognition 275 300 9 144 25
AtrialFibrillation 15 15 2 640 3
BasicMotions 40 40 6 100 4
CharacterTrajectories 1422 1436 3 182 20
Cricket 108 72 6 1197 12
Epilepsy 137 138 3 206 4
EthanolConcentration 261 263 3 1751 4
ERing 30 270 4 65 6
FingerMovements 316 100 28 50 2
HandMovementDirection 160 74 10 400 4
Handwriting 150 850 3 152 26
JapeneseVowels 270 370 12 29 9
Libras 180 180 2 45 15
LSST 2459 2466 6 36 14
NATOPS 180 180 24 51 6
PenDigits 7494 3498 2 8 10
RacketSports 151 152 6 30 4
UWaveGestureLibrary 120 320 3 315 8
on the real distance matrix if we determine the top class on
this representation
To compute this soft probabilistic representation, consider a
set of distance matrices V computed using a distance measure
such as DTW between all possible pairs of samples between
the two datasets being compared.
Algorithm 1: Equivalent Probabilistic Representation of
the Distance Matrix for 1-Nearest Neighbor Classification
Data: V is a distance matrix of shape
[Ntest;Ntrain;NChannels] and y is the train set
label vector of length Ntrain
Result: Softmax normalized predictions p of shape
[Ntest;C] and the discrete label vector q of
length Ntest
begin
V ←− (−V )
uniqueLabels = Unique(y) //Unique Class Labels
Vc = []
for ci ∈ uniqueLabels do
vc = V(y=ci) //[Ntest;Ntrain(y = ci);NChannels]
vc_max = max(vc) //[Ntest]
Vc.append(vc_max)
V ′ = concatenate(Vc) //[Ntest; # of classes]
p = softmax(V ′) //[Ntest; # of classes]
q = argmax(p) //[Ntest]
return (p,q)
Algorithm 1 is an intermediate standardization algorithm
that accepts a set of V distance matrices and the training class
labels of y as inputs, and calculates an analogous probabilistic
representation that can be used directly to determine the 1-
Nearest Neighbor. The Soft-1NN algorithm selects all samples
that belong to a class ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , C} as vc, computes
the maximum over all train samples for that class, then appends
the vector vc_max to the list Vc. The concatenation of all of
these lists of vectors in Vc then represents the matrix V ′,
which is passed to the softmax function, as shown in Equation
5 with T set to 1, to represent this matrix V ′ as a probabilistic
equivalent of the original distance matrix V . An implicit
restriction placed on Algorithm 1 is that the representation is
equivalent only when computing the 1-NN DTW. It cannot be
used to to represent the K-NN DTW (or any other distance
metric) and therefore cannot be used for K-NN classification.
However, in time series classification, the value of K is typically
set to 1 for nearest neighbor classifiers. While the Algorithm 1
has been used to convert the 1-NN DTW distance matrices, any
set of distance matrices used for 1-NN classification algorithms
can also be used to standardize it.
B. Results
Figures 2 and 3 depict the results from white-box attacks
on 1-NN DTW and FCN that are applied on 18 multivariate
time series datasets. Figures 4 and 5 represent the results from
black-box attacks on 1-NN DTW and FCN classifiers trained on
the same 18 datasets. Experimental results for these 18 dataset
aimed to generate adversaries for only one class. The detailed
results can be found in Appendix A. The proposed methodology
is successful in capturing adversaries on all datasets.
The number of adversaries in each dataset and the amount
of perturbation per sample are reliant on the hyper-parameters
being tested on. As an example, the dataset “AtrialFibrillation”
was only able to generate multiple adversaries for the black-box
attack on 1-NN DTW when the target class was 0. However,
if the target class is 1, the number of adversaries generated
increases to 5, 2, 3, 13 for a black-box attack on 1-NN DTW,
white-box attack on 1-NN DTW, black-box attack on FCN and
white-box attack on FCN, respectively. These numbers could
potentially be higher if the hyper-parameters are optimized for
this target class. Additionally, the target class has a significant
impact on the adversary being produced because of the ATN’s
loss function. For time series groups, it is easier to generate
adversaries which are identical to one another. A Wilcoxson
7signed-rank test is utilized to compare the number of adversaries
generated by white-box and black-box attacks on FCN and
1-NN DTW classifiers that are trained on the 18 datasets,
summarized in Table II. Our findings indicate that the FCN
classifier is more susceptible to a white-box attack compared
with a 1-NN DTW white-box attack. It should be noted that
the FCN classifier white-box attack is producing considerably
more adversaries than its counterparts. This is because the
attack with the white-box is explicitly on the FCN model and
not on a student model approximating the classifier’s behaviour.
We observe that the number of adversarial samples obtained
on FCN classifiers from black-box attacks is greater than the
number of adversarial samples from either white-box or black-
box attacks on DTW classifiers. A Wilcoxson signed-rank
test supports this finding by showing a statistically significant
difference (at a rate of 0.05) in the number of adversarial
samples observed on 1-NN DTW classifiers due to black-
box or white-box attacks versus the number of adversarial
samples obtained by black-box attacks on FCN classifiers. We
also detect that 1-NN DTW classifiers under either type of
attack have approximately the same number of adversaries
generated. Finally, we find that FCNs has the least number
of adversarial samples after black-box attacks, although each
of these samples requires indistinguishable disturbances to
the original signal. These observations are important to future
research into the development of time series classifiers, as
the number of adversarial samples generated under each
methodology can be used as a secondary evaluation metric
to measure the robustness of a model. The average MSE of
adversarial samples after black-box attacks on FCN classifiers is
lower than the average MSE of the adversarial samples obtained
via black-box and white-box attacks on 1-NN DTW classifiers,
but only statistically significant when compared to white-box,
as observed in Table III. A lower MSE indicates the black-box
attack on FCN classifiers requires minimal perturbations per
time series sample in comparison to the attacks on 1-NN DTW
classifiers.
Now we test how well GATN generalizes onto an unseen
dataset, Dtest, such that GATN does not require any additional
training. This is beneficial in situations where the time series
adversarial samples are generated in constant time of a single
forward pass of the GATN model without requiring further
training. Such a generalization is uncommon to adversarial
methodologies because they require retraining to generate
adversarial samples. Our proposed methodology is robust,
successfully generating adversarial samples on data that is
unseen to both the GATN and the student models, for the
respective targeted time series classification models. Figure
6 depicts the number of adversarial samples detected, on an
unseen dataset, with a white-box and black-box attack on the 1-
NN DTW classifiers and FCN classifiers. The white-box attack
on the FCN classifier obtains the most adversarial samples per
dataset. This is followed by a white-box and black-box attack
on the 1-NN DTW, which show similar number of adversarial
samples constructed. Finally, we find that the FCN classifier
is the least susceptible to black-box attacks.
The unique consequence of this generalization is the
application of trained GATN models for attacks that are
feasible on real world devices, even for black-box attacks. The
deployment of a trained GATN with the paired student model
affords a near constant-time cost of generating reasonable
number of adversarial samples. As the forward pass of the
GATN requires few resources, and the student model is
small enough to compute the input gradient (x˜) in reasonable
time, these attacks can be constructed without significant
computation on small, portable devices. Therefore, the fact that
certain classifiers that are trained on certain datasets can be
attacked without requiring any additional on-device training is
concerning.
TABLE II
WILCOXSON SIGNED-RANK TEST COMPARING THE NUMBER OF
ADVERSARIES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT ATTACKS
White-box
1-NN DTW
Black-box
FCN
White-box
FCN
Black-box
1-NN DTW 1.99E-01 1.02E-03 1.59E-03
White-box
1-NN DTW 1.28E-03 3.26E-04
Black-box
FCN 2.92E-04
TABLE III
WILCOXSON SIGNED-RANK TEST COMPARING THE MSE BETWEEN THE
DIFFERENT ATTACKS
White-box
1-NN DTW
Black-box
FCN
White-box
FCN
Black-box
1-NN DTW 1.33E-01 6.42E-02 1.08E-02
White-box
1-NN DTW 2.49E-02 7.07E-02
Black-box
FCN 4.34E-03
V. CONCLUSION
This work proposes a model distillation technique to
mimic the behavior of the various classical multivariate time
series classification models and an adversarial transformation
network to attack various multivariate time series datasets. The
proposed methodology is applied onto 1-NN DTW and Fully
Connected Network (FCN) that are trained on 18 University
of East Anglia (UEA) and University of California Riverside
(UCR) datasets. All 18 datasets showed to be susceptible to
at least one type of attack. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time multivariate time series classifiers have been
attacked using adversarial neural networks. The classical 1-NN
DTW proved to be more robust to adversarial attacks than the
FCN model. We suggest potential researchers creating models
for the classification of time series to take model robustness as
an evaluative metric. In addition, we suggest that adversarial
data samples be integrated into their training data sets to further
enhance resistance to adversarial attacks.
8Fig. 2. White-box attack on 1-NN DTW that is trained on 18 datasets
Fig. 3. White-box attack on FCN that is trained on 18 datasets
9Fig. 4. Black-box attack on 1-NN DTW that is trained on 18 datasets
Fig. 5. Black-box attack on FCN that is trained on 18 datasets
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Fig. 6. Black-box and white-box attacks on FCN and 1-NN DTW classifiers that are tested on Dtest without any retraining.
APPENDIX A
DETAILED RESULTS
TABLE IV
BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON 1-NN DTW MODELS
Dataset Num. of Adversaries MSE
ArticularyWordRecognition 8 0.063085
AtrialFibrillation 2 0.015005
BasicMotions 2 0.114111
CharacterTrajectories 202 0.08986
Cricket 0 0.012914
Epilepsy 5 0.123488
ERing 30 0.128423
EthanolConcentration 72 0.466593
FingerMovements 10 0.09904
HandMovementDirection 2 0.004315
Handwriting 49 0.125444
JapaneseVowels 28 0.090313
Libras 31 0.142043
LSST 219 0.185534
NATOPS 14 0.073556
PenDigits 293 0.197882
RacketSports 14 0.147109
UWaveGestureLibrary 34 0.075413
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TABLE V
WHITE-BOX ATTACK ON 1-NN DTW MODELS
Dataset Num. of Adversaries MSE
ArticularyWordRecognition 18 0.104909
AtrialFibrillation 0 0.061174
BasicMotions 3 0.105032
CharacterTrajectories 203 0.084731
Cricket 1 0.013019
Epilepsy 11 0.249629
ERing 29 0.176111
EthanolConcentration 26 0.033794
FingerMovements 8 0.071567
HandMovementDirection 4 0.023995
Handwriting 61 0.206134
JapaneseVowels 33 0.114339
Libras 31 0.109957
LSST 223 0.285733
NATOPS 16 0.129278
PenDigits 123 0.136015
RacketSports 16 0.157508
UWaveGestureLibrary 52 0.373157
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TABLE VI
BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON FCN MODELS
Dataset Num. of Adversaries MSE
ArticularyWordRecognition 4 0.000156
AtrialFibrillation 1 0.016261
BasicMotions 4 0.131301
CharacterTrajectories 9 0.002883
Cricket 1 3.046668
Epilepsy 5 0.203446
ERing 9 0.10876
EthanolConcentration 10 0.019332
FingerMovements 3 0.0031
HandMovementDirection 2 0.018381
Handwriting 2 0.012477
JapaneseVowels 17 0.043202
Libras 3 0.200899
LSST 27 0.01518
NATOPS 3 0.011849
PenDigits 129 0.129774
RacketSports 5 0.096207
UWaveGestureLibrary 11 0.016174
TABLE VII
WHITE-BOX ATTACK ON FCN MODELS
Dataset Num. of Adversaries MSE
ArticularyWordRecognition 223 0.103408
AtrialFibrillation 1 0.027168
BasicMotions 14 0.196938
CharacterTrajectories 706 0.300598
Cricket 15 0.083996
Epilepsy 32 0.859604
ERing 118 0.250408
EthanolConcentration 37 0.05864
FingerMovements 13 0.127995
HandMovementDirection 17 0.006507
Handwriting 94 0.076364
JapaneseVowels 224 0.512852
Libras 24 0.259869
LSST 376 0.141442
NATOPS 69 0.178026
PenDigits 850 0.270337
RacketSports 39 0.236502
UWaveGestureLibrary 166 0.248728
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